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IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC IMPACT
ANALYSIS: THE LESSONS OF OSHA
BARRY ROBERTS*

and

REGINA KOSSEK**

Recently, a plethora of concern has surfaced regarding the
large and rapidly increasing costs of government regulation and
its impact upon the economy and the free market system.' Much
of this displeasure has focused on a seemingly ideal target-The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA
was established in 19702 amidst widespread optimism that it
would greatly enhance the employee work environment.' This
hope, however, was premature; in fact, many commentators
argue that, in the ten years since its creation, OSHA has done
little to further its objective of improving safety and health in
the workplace, despite the large compliance costs it has
generated.'
This article will first review recent cases concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act); the Benzene,' Cot* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law
School.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Kansas; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
ARTHUR ANDERSON & CO., COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION STUDY FOR
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (1979); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
REDEFINING GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE MARKET PLACE (1979); OSHA SAFETY
REGULATION: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE (P.W. MacAvoy ed. 1977);
UNSETTLED QUESTIONS ON REGULATORY REFORM (P.W. MacAvoy ed. 1978);
Kosters, "Counting the Costs," REGULATION, July/August 1979, at 17; Levin,
"Politics and Polarity-The Limits of OSHA Reform," REGULATION, Nov./Dec.

1979, at 33; Nichols & Zeckhauser, "Government Comes to the Workplace: An
Assessment of OSHA," 31 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 39 (1977); Weidenbaum,
"Viewpoint-On Estimating Regulatory Costs," REGULATION May/June, 1978, at 14.
2 The Occupation Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF

1970 (1971); Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 1, at 39-42.
' See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STUDY, supra note 1, at Chapter 8, p. 1 through
27; BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE: MEASUREMENT OF THE BENEFIT (1980);
Kosters, supra note 1; Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 1, at 39-42; Weidenbaum,
supra note 1.
I American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), affd sub
nom. Industrial Union Dep't. AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
2844 (1980).
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ton Dust," and Coke Oven Emissions' decisions, and then examine the feasibility of OSHA using cost-benefit analysis in promulgating new standards for industry.
I.

OSHA: AN INTRODUCTION

In 1970, the nation was in the throes of a mounting public
outcry lamenting the significant costs of labor hours lost
through injury and disease. This prompted Congress to establish OSHA as a vehicle to solve the "lost labor" problem.' Occupational disease and injuries were thought to be causing a
steep decline in national productivity9 and "something had to be
done."'" Congress believed that both the economy and workers
would benefit if occupational disease and injury could be
eliminated, and that an agency such as OSHA would be an effective means to reach this goal."
Several comprehensive studies however have subsequently
indicated that the establishment of a federal agency to regulate
the work environment may not be the appropriate mechanism to
alleviate the problem." In the area of occupational safety (as opposed to occupational disease) these studies attribute as much as
ninety percent of the cause of industrial accidents to the workers and only ten percent to mechanical or equipment factors."
OSHA safety regulation, with an emphasis on technological safety, may not be focusing its efforts on the "real" cause of industrial accidents.
OSHA has promulgated a number of regulations with just
such an emphasis in an effort to protect workers; the economic
cost which this course of action has resulted in is staggering."

' AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) cerL grantedsub nom.
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980).

' American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted sub noma. Republic Steel Co. v. OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054, cert. dismissed,

10.1 S. Ct. 38 (1980).
See note 3 supra.
'But see R.

SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (1976).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 141-46.
11 See note 4 supra.

" See generally Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 1.
"Id. at 49-50; SMITH, supra note 9, at 64-70.
" See note 4 supra.
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These costs can be divided into four different categories: administrative costs, compliance costs, inefficiency costs and transfer
costs. 5 Administrative costs are those incurred by the agency,
in this case OSHA, in carrying out its functions. 6 Compliance
costs are those which are incurred by the regulated companies.
These costs include any incremental cost to the firm in complying with the regulations, such as paperwork and capital improvements. 6 -' Inefficiency costs are represented by the cost of
lost production and lost resources caused by regulatory
misallocation. 7 The final category, transfer costs, represent the
shifting of costs and benefits among different groups in society. 8
Compliance costs have been the subject of much industry
discontent, and have given rise to many lawsuits concerning the
OSH Act, and the standard which should be used by OSHA
when promulgating regulations. The position taken by industry
has been that compliance costs must be considered in the formulation of standards. This position, in its many forms, has met
with varied success.
Initially, industry challenged standards on two grounds.
Under section 6(b)(5) of OSH Act, the Secretary of Labor in promulgating permanent standards regulating worker exposure to
toxic materials and harmful physical agents is required to set
the standard at a level which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence that no employee will suffer no
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life. 9
Feasibility was interpreted as incorporating both
technological and economic feasibility. Concerning economic
feasibility, OSHA, and subsequently the courts," took the position that:
15Kosters, supra note 1; Weidenbaum, supra note 1.
Is Wiedenbaum, supra note 1, at 15.
18.1
Id.
17 Id.

"Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Turner Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Standards may be economically feasible even though, from
the standpoint of employers, they are financially burdensome
and affect profit margins adversely. Nor does the concept of
economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued existence of individual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the Act to envisage the economic
demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is
consequently financially unable
to comply with new standards
21
as quickly as other employers.
Industry, has taken the term feasibility and argued that for
a regulation to be feasible, not only need the industry, in
general, be able to absorb the costs, but the benefits of such a
regulation must outweigh the costs.' With this assertion, industry has framed its "cost-benefit" argument.
In interpreting the statute (as it applies to standards for toxic substances) a major and significant controversy has arisen as
to the need to consider "cost-benefit" analysis. As will be
discussed in detail below, the Fifth Circuit, in its Benzene decision concluded that a general cost-benefit analysis was a significant factual component of the Secretary's record, without which
the Secretary would have great difficulty in defending a proposed standard as being supported by substantial evidence as
required by the Act.w Faced with the same question, the D.C.
Circuit in AFL-CIO v. Marshall' and the Third Circuit in
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA2 have rejected any costbenefit analysis requirement.
21 577 F.2d at 835. Furthermore, the courts have recognized that even

though a standard is not promulgated under authority of section 6(b)(5) or does
not contain the term feasible, OSHA can and should consider economic information, 581 F.2d 493. This reasoning is based upon the "reasonably necessary"
language of section 3(8):
The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard
which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (emphasis added). For an interesting criticism of the basis of the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning see Rothstein, OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and
Some ProposedReforms, 34 VAND. L. REV. 71, 79-87 (1981).
1 See, e.g., industry arguments in Benzene, 581 F.2d at 501; Coke Oven, 577
F.2d at 835-36; Cotton Dust, 617 F.2d at 662-63.
23 581 F.2d at 503-04.
2 617 F.2d 636.
"n 577 F.2d 825.
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The Benzene case was appealed and on July 2, 1980 the
Supreme Court handed down its Benzene decision which industry and government had hoped would settle the controversy.
The high court's decision discreetly avoided the issue. On the
same date certiorariwas granted in American Iron & Steel Inst.
v. OSHA (Coke Oven Emissions), with the grant specifically recognizing the importance of resolving the cost-benefit issue."
Certiorari was also granted in AFL-CIO v. Marshall (Cotton
Dust)7 on the cost-benefit issues. Surprisingly Coke Oven Emissions was dismissed pursuant to Court Rule 53 on September 10,
1980.8 Consequently, resolution of the controversy rests on Cotton Dust which was argued on January 21, 1 9 8 1 .'
A major controversy with significant economic overtones
may thus be nearing resolution. With this background, the cases
will be reviewed and an approach to resolving this controversy
suggested.
II.
A.

OSHA: THE RECENT DEBATE CONCERNING THE
UTILIZATION OF ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA

In American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA3 (Coke Oven Emissions) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with an industry challenge to the Coke Oven Emissions standard3' promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, a standard which attempted to
reduce worker's exposure to the toxic emissions generated in
the production of coke. Coke, a fuel used principally by steel producing companies is produced by heating coal to extremely high
temperatures (20000) in ovens. During this process various gases
are emitted which are undisputedly carcinogenic. 2 OSHA set
the permissible exposure limit at no greater than 0.15 mg of the
benzene-soluable fraction of total particulate matter per cubic
meter of air averaged over an eight-hour period (0.15 mg/m
BSFTPM). The standard prescribed particular controls which
"
"

100 S. Ct. 3054.
101 S. Ct. 68.
101 S. Ct. 38.

For a summary of the oral argument in this case as well as some of the
Justices' concerns during the oral argument see 49 U.S.L.W. 3523 (Jan. 21, 1981).

"o577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1979).
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029 (1980).
577 F.2d at 831.

01
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were to be instituted as well as additional steps to be taken if
the required controls did not satisfactorily reduce the emissions.
Among the challenges to this standard, industry representatives claimed that the need for the prescribed exposure limit
and the feasibility of attaining the prescribed limit were not supported by substantial scientific evidence. The court phrased the
issues as follows:
Is there substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the
ambient atmosphere of a coke oven contains particulate matter
to which there is no safe level of exposure? Is the Secretary's
limit feasible as required by [the Act]?3
The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the
Secretary's determination that coke oven emissons are carcinogenic and that no safe level of exposure was shown to be supported by substantial evidence. The court next had to address
the propriety of the 0.15 mg/m 3 BSFTPM exposure level. The
court noted that section 6(b)(5) of the Act required the Secretary
to set the standard "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible

. . .

that no employee will suffer material impair-

ment." In attempting to formulate the lowest possible exposure
level, the court recognized that OSHA is constrained by both
economic and technological feasibility limits as set out in AFL v.
Brennan.- The court concluded that compliance with the exposure level was technologically feasible.
As to economic feasibility, the court recognized that Congress did not intend to eliminate all health hazards at the price
of crippling industry and cited Industrial UnionDep't., AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, a 1974 case dealing with permissible levels of
asbestos dust. In Industrial Union the use of the word "feasible" was taken to mean "that practical consideration can temper
3

Id.

530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975).
1 Industrial Union Dep't. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), was a
case concerning permissible asbestos exposure standards. Asbestos was known to
be a carcinogen, and OSHA took steps to regulate its use. Union petitioners,
however, challenged the OSHA reforms on the ground that implementation over
the prescribed period of four years was too slow in light of the great health
hazard from asbestos. The court upheld OSHA on all but two minor points, finding that OSHA could look to economic and technological feasibility when promulgating regulations.
4
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protective requirements. Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out of
business.""8 However, Industrial Union goes on to state that
this qualification is not intended to provide a route by which
recalcitrant employers or industries may avoid the reforms contemplated by the Act. Standards may be economically feasible
even though ...they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins adversely. Nor does the concept . . .necessarily
guarantee the continued existence of individual employers. '
Thus, Industrial Union was relied upon as authority for not
requiring that costs be taken into account.
Based upon the detailed factual record in this case, the circuit court was satisfied with OSHA's justification for the regulation and denied the challenge despite the lack of any quantifiable cost-benefit figures.
B. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA
In American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA (Benzene)' the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that OSHA in setting standards
should perform an informal cost-benefit analysis. This case arose
from a challenge to an OSHA regulation which reduced the approved level of exposure to benzene from 10ppm (parts per million) in air to 1 ppm in air; prohibited dermal contact with
benzene; and instituted certain labelling requirements concerning benzene.2 9 These restrictions were made because benzene is
a carcinogen.? The change in approved levels of exposure was
the primary point of industry outrage. For many years, the standard had been 25 ppm in air. It was subsequently reduced to 10
ppm based upon evidence that benzene at that level was carcinogenic." The further ten-fold reduction was based upon the
' 499 F.2d at 478.
37 Id.

581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
The Secretary proposed the standard dealing with benzene, a toxic
material, in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). The proposed standards, to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028, published at 43 Fed. Reg. 5918-70 (1970), imposed numerous compliance requirements upon the petitioners.
0 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals carefully laid out the scientific
evidence and tests relevant to the toxic effects of benzene, 581 F.2d at 498-99.
" See generally 581 F.2d at 498. The American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists recommended the following limitations: in 1946-100 ppm,
1947-50 ppm, 1948-35 ppm, 1963-25 ppm, 1974-10 ppm. The American National
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rationale that no safe level of exposure to benzene could be
determined. 2 Industry spokesmen claimed that there existed no
proof that any benefit would be derived from the more stringent
regulations, and that in view of the tremendous cost of compliance, estimated at up to five billion dollars, the regulation should
be set aside. OSHA, however, argued that costs, in this instance,
should not be a factor. OSHA argued that it is not required to
undertake a cost-benefit analysis in promulgating standards of
exposure to toxic substances since the Act did not specifically
mandate such an approach. 3 OSHA claimed that its standard
was reasonable when judged by both the "substantial evidence"4 ' and the "best 4available
evidence"' 5 standards required
6
by the text of the Act.

Benzene focused upon two basic issues: (1) whether the
regulation was "supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole,'

7

and (2) in determining what is reason-

ably necessary to provide a safe workplace whether OSHA must
assess the expected benefits in light of the compliance costs.
The ultimate holding combines these two elements:
[OSHA's] failure to provide an estimate of expected benefits for
reducing the permissible exposure limit, supported by substantial evidence, makes it impossible to assess the reasonableness

Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted the 10 ppm limitation in 1969; OSHA adopted
the ANSI standard in 1971 without formal rulemaking pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
655(a). Id.
581 F.2d at 498, 501, 503.
OSHA claimed that a study had been undertaken and the standard was
promulgated after consideration of the results, id. at 502.
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976) provides that "determinations of the Secretary
shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered
as a whole."
5 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), pertaining to standards for toxic materials and
harmful physical agents further provides that the Secretary is to:
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment ....(emphasis added).
" The substantial evidence standard has been construed to place the burden
of proof on OSHA to show that "the Secretary carried out his essentially
legislative task in a manner reasonable under the state of the record before him."
581 F.2d at 497. See generally K. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 6
(1978).
1 581 F.2d at 497.
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of the relationship between expected costs and benefits. This
failure means that the required support is lacking to show reasonable necessity for the standard promulgated. Consequently,
the reduction of the permissible exposure limit from 10 ppm to
1 ppm and all other parts of the standard geared to the 1 ppm
level must be set aside.'"

In rejecting OSHA's contention that the Act gave it unbridled discretion in providing workers with a safe work environment 9 the court required that OSHA "assess" the expected
benefits in light of the burdens to be imposed by the standard.'
Moreover, unlike the showing found acceptable in the Coke
Oven Emissions case, the Fifth Circuit stated that the expected
benefits must be supported by substantial evidence and not
mere conjecture."' The agency must look "at the potential the
standard has for reducing the severity or frequency of the injury, and the effect the standard would have on the utility, cost
or availability of the product." 2

" 581 F.2d at 505. Concerning the other portions of the contested regulation
the court held: (1) that the provisions prohibiting dermal contact were not supported by adequate and sufficient scientific data-they were based upon inconclusive and dated scientific evidence and not upon superior new scientific procedures, and (2) that the labelling requirements be vacated since their validity
was premised upon the other two portions of the regulation, id. at 508-10.
11"Rather than attempting to measure the extent to which the leukemia
hazard of benzene exposure would be reduced by lowering the permissible exposure limit from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, OSHA merely assumed that benefits from the
reduction 'may be appreciable.' It based this assumption on a finding that benzene
was unsafe at any level and its conclusion that exposures to lower levels of toxic
materials would be safer than exposures to higher levels." Id. at 503 (emphasis
supplied). However, the court found that substantial evidence does not support
OSHA's conclusion that benefits are likely to be appreciable and "OSHA is unable
to justify a finding that the benefits ... bear a reasonable relationship to its onehalf billion dollar price tag." Id. at 503.
" "Although the agency does not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit
analysis ... it does have to determine whether the benefits expected from the
standard bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard." Id.
at 503. Cf. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). See also RMI Co. v. Sec'y of Labor and OSHARC, 594
F.2d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 1979).
11581 F.2d at 505.
62Id. at 502, (quoting from Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 844).
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C. AFL-CIO v. Marshall
In AFL-CIO v. Marshall (Cotton-Dust),3 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that cost-benefit analysis is
not required to be carried out by OSHA prior to promulgating
regulations. The case involved industry challenge to an OSHA
standard regulating exposure to cotton dust. Exposure to cotton
dust is known to cause bysinosis, commonly called brown lung
disease. The standard set by OSHA called for exposure levels
limited to 200 micrograms per cubic meter in yarn manufacturing; 750 micrograms per cubic meter in slashing and weaving
operations, and 500 micrograms per cubic meter for all other
processes in the cotton industry." Industry argued that the new
standards would force manufacturers to incur enormous costs
with few benefits. Union petitioners argued that the standards
did not go far enough in protecting the workers from lung disease.
Judge Bazelon, writing for a unanimous court, upheld the
standard reasoning that regulations are economically feasible as
long as they do not go so far as to put the entire industry out of
business. 5 This decision was based on the fact that Congress did
not call for an economic analysis in the text of the Act. 6 The
court found that costs and benefits are too difficult to measure
and therefore such analysis should not be required. The court
partially based its decision on Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson," a case cited as authority by the Third Circuit in its
Coke Oven Emissions decision.
As to the conflict among the circuits concerning the need for
cost-benefit analysis, the D.C. Circuit specifically rejected the
Benzene rationale and the need for cost-benefit analysis.
Although the court encouraged such estimates, it held that the
"Act constrains its regulation of dangerous substances 'only by
the limits of feasibility'."" Congress was unequivocal in its mandate that OSHA must:

'

617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id. at 647-48.
Id. at 664-65.

National Industrial Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979).
499 F.2d 467.
617 F.2d at 663 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. at 27378).
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set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity. 59
Based upon this statutory wording Judge Bazelon felt that it
was Congress' intent to protect the worker and that whatever
expenses were incurred would be acceptable. 0 Nothing in the
Act required OSHA to determine whether the benefits bore a
reasonable relationship to the costs."
The court found that "to protect workers from material
health impairment, OSHA must rely on predictions of possible
future events and extrapolationsfrom limited data. It may have
to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considerations."'"And, for
permitted OSHA to act
that reason the court felt that Congress
''
on the "best available evidence."
D.

The U.S. Supreme Court Jumps Into the Fray

Enter the Supreme Court with its Benzene decision. Faced
with the appeal of the challenge to the benzene standard, the
Supreme Court struck down the standard without deciding6 4the
cost-benefit issue, specifically leaving the issue unresolved.
The opinion was a 5-4 consensus opinion with Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist writing concurrences. Justice Powell alone believed that the cost-benefit issue
had to be addressed and held that a cost-benefit -analysis was
indeed required. The plurality struck down the standard based
upon the following rationale: section 3(8) of the Act defines an
"occupational safety and health standard as a standard that is
reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe and
healthful employment." Where toxic materials are concerned section 6(b)(5) also applies and requires the Secretary to "set the
617 F.2d at 663-64 (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)).
"We are talking about people's lives not the indifference of some cost accountants." Id. at 664 (quoting Senator Yarborough, LEGIS. HISTORY at 510).
11Id. at 664-65. Moreover, the court's role in this process is to ensure that
the agency carries out its mandate in a reasonable manner. Id. at 648-52.
Id. at 651 (emphasis supplied).
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
2844 (1980).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible
...that no employee will suffer material impairment ... ." Based
upon section 3(8) of the Act the initial burden is on OSHA to
show a "significant risk." Absent this showing of hazard, OSHA
does not meet its burden of proof-the threshold showing that
the standard is "reasonably necessary or appropriate."
In the current case, there was no question that a causal connection existed between exposure to high concentrations of benzene and leukemia. OSHA, however, took this one step further.
Based upon a general policy, OSHA assumed that when carcinogens are involved, there are no presumed safe levels and the
exposure limit must be set at the lowest feasible level.65
The plurality held that this showing did not meet OSHA's
burden of proof. OSHA did not show a "significant risk" requiring regulation. Consequently, the plurality held that OSHA had
exceeded its standard setting authority and thus it did not need
to reach the issue of whether or not costs and benefits must be
weighed. Although the plurality did not reach the cost-benefit
issue it did provide extremely relevant guidance. Initially, it
should be noted that the plurality was definitive in stating:
We think it is clear that the statute was not designed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces
whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long as the
cost is not great enough to destroy an entire industry. Rather,
both the language and structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm."
Although the plurality recognized that OSHA's mandate is
to "attain the highest degree of health and safety protection for
employees," it denied that OSHA had unbridled discretion to
create absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless of cost. 7 Look-

' 100 S. Ct. at 2855. At the time the benzene standard was promulgated the
above "carcinogen policy" had not been formally promulgated and adopted as
standard. On January 22, 1980, OSHA adoped a formal policy for regulating carcinogens incorporating its "carcinogen policy," effective April 21, 1980, 45 Fed.
Reg. 5002, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (generic carcinogen standard). In its Benzene
decision, the Court makes no determination as to the propriety of the formally
promulgated generic carcinogen standard.
100 S. Ct. at 2864.
Id. at 2850 n.4.
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ing at the legislative history, the plurality noted Congress' concern with giving OSHA too much power over industry and cited
Congress' (a) failure to give the Secretary power to unilaterally
shut down plants, (b) imposition of procedural requirements
upon the Secretary in promulgating emergency standards, and
(c) creation of an independent review commission to oversee the
Agency, as evidence of Congress' desire to limit the Agency's
authority. 8
The Justice Steven's plurality opinion was clearly concerned
with OSHA's perceived power to impose costs with little, if any,
discernible benefit.
As presently formulated, the benzene standard is an expensive way of providing some additional protection for a relatively
small number of employees.... The figures outlined in OSHA's
explanation of the costs of compliance to various industries indicate that only 35,000 employees will gain any benefit from the
regulation in terms of a reduction in their exposure to
benzene.' 9
The opinion then computed cost of compliance with the
benzene standard per employee in each affected industry. Due
to differences in cost of compliance per industry and the
numbers of workers exposed, the costs ranged from a low of
$1,390 per rubber manufacturing employee to $82,000 per
petroleum refining industry employee.7 ' The plurality further
noted that OSHA did not quantify the benefits to each of the
various categories workers. Mr. Justice Stevens also stated that
"[iln light of the fact that there are literally thousands of
substances used in the workplace that have been identified as
carcinogens or suspected carcinogens, the Government's theory
would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might
71
produce little, if any, discernible benefit."
The plurality also noted that the Act, itself, required prioritizing the need for establishing new standards, based upon the
section 6(g)7 2 requirement that the Secretary promulgate stan-

Id. at 2866-69.

Id. at 2857.
, Id. at 2858.
" Id. at 2866.
72 Id. at 2862.
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dards to eliminate the most serious hazards first. The government conceded that this section requires some cost-benefit analysis, although the Secretary argued that these prioritizing decisions are policy decisions, subject at best to limited judicial
review."3
The plurality opinion then noted that OSHA did not totally
ignore costs in promulgating the benzene standard. Despite the
fact that OSHA assumed that no safe exposure limit existed,
OSHA did not try to totally eliminate the use of benzene."
Finally, the plurality noted that its formulation of "significant risk" inherently incorporates some "cost-benefit" analysis.
While it refused to require that significant risk be shown with
"mathematical certainty," the plurality stated:
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable. If for example, the odds are one in a billion that a
person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated
water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant. On
the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are two percent benzene will be
fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it."5
Because this was a plurality opinion leaving the economic
issue unresolved, it is important to consider the concurring and
dissenting opinions. As previously stated, Justice Powell, alone,
believed that cost-benefit analysis is required under the Act. In
a strongly worded concurrence, he stated that "the statute ...
requires the agency [OSHA] to determine that the economic effects of its standards bear a reasonable relationship to the expected benefits.""6 Justice Powell believed that a standard could
not meet the requirements of the Act without economic justification. He recognized the magnitude of the problem of controlling
exposure to toxic substances and stated that a rational system
of regulation must consider costs and benefits in allocating
limited resources.
Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion felt that the
Secretary did not meet the minimal threshold requirement of
7 Id.

" Id. at 2871.
75

Id.

" 100 S. Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring).
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finding "significant risk" which is the necessary justification
for imposition of OSH Act regulation." However, in dicta that of
necessity had to be aimed at the economic analysis question, he
noted the differing functions of courts and administrative agencies. "The Congress is the ultimate regulator and the narrow
function of the courts is to discern the meaning of the statute
and implementing regulations ....The judicial function does not
extend to substantive revision of regulatory policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and Executive oversight
or amendatory legislation; although to be sure the boundaries
8
are often ill defined and indistinct."
While this language shows the Chief Justice's desire to
strictly adhere to the concept of separation of power, assuming
that the Court is able to discern Congressional desire, he also
notes that responsible administrative action refrains from regulation of the insignificant or de minimus risk. "Perfect safety is
a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the
search for the impossible." 9
Justice Rehnquist, while concurring in the judgment invalidating the standard, reaches that conclusion in a manner totally
at variance with the plurality opinion. Justice Rehnquist would
invalidate section 6(b)(5) of the Act as an improper delegation of
authority by Congress to the Secretary of Labor. He recognizes
that the issue of considering economic costs in relation to safety
benefits is one of the most difficult issues that could confront a
decision-maker and to Justice Rehnquist, Congress, not the
Secretary of Labor, is "best suited and most obligated to make
the choice." 0 He concludes that the standard set forth in section
6(b)(5) is an improper delegation of power. Furthermore, he does
not find additional guidance in the OSH Act's legislative history,
nor does he believe that the standardless delegation was justifiable in light of "inherent necessities."8 Consequently, he would
invalidate the first sentence of section 6(b)(5) leaving the Secretary the option of setting safe standards or no standards at all.2

100 S. Ct. at 2874 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
.Id. at 2874-75.
" Id. at 2875.
'o Id. at 2879 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
81 Id. at 2881.
Id. at 2887.
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The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined in by
Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun states that the plurality's
opinion goes beyond the Court's authority. "In cases of statutory construction... [i]f the statutory language and legislative
intent are plain, the judicial inquiry is at an end." To Justice
Marshall the "plain meaning" of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act is clear and the Secretary's actions were well within
his power and based upon substantial evidence. The dissent
believes that the plurality opinion ignores the plain meaning of
the Act in an attempt to impose the plurality view of proper
regulatory policy and "the plurality's discussion of the record in
this case is both extraordinarily arrogant and extraordinarily
unfair.,,"

*

On the issue of cost-benefit analysis, while the dissent
recognizes that some balancing of costs and benefits may be
necessary, the dissent voices its unified belief that the legislative history and the Act evidence Congress' antipathy toward
cost-benefit balancing. The dissent interprets a standard to be
economically feasible "if it is capable of achievement, not if its
benefits out*eigh its costs."8
III.

OSHA: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH

Where does the Supreme Court Benzene decision leave us?
Only Justice Powell believes that cost-benefit analysis is required in the OSH Act regulatory process. The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist generate
varying signals with Chief Justice Burger clearly wanting to
limit the Supreme Court's role yet conscious of the need to prevent administrative action from strangling economic activity
and Justice Rehnquist claiming that cost-benefit analysis in the
OSH Act context is an improper delegation of power. The dissent's disagreement with imputing a cost-benefit analysis requirement into the Act is clear.
Appellate decisions on the economic analysis issue after the
Supreme Court's Benzene decision have not been definitive. The
Fifth Circuit in Texas Independent Ginners Assn. v. Marshall
Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2890.
Id. at 2902.
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(Cotton Gin) 8 and the District of Columbia Circuit Court in

United Steelworkers v. Marshall (Lead Case)87 have been faced
with the economic analysis issue. In both cases the circuit courts
continued to apply the conflicting interpretations of their earlier
decisions. In Texas Independent Ginners, the Fifth Circuit, the
same court which had determined in the appellate Benzene case
that cost-benefit analysis was necessary, determined that under
the procedure set forth in the Supreme Court's Benzene decision, OSHA had not met the threshold requirement of showing
exposure to cotton dust was a significant health risk. The court
found deficiencies in the studies relied upon by the agency and
then concluded that OSHA had not met the cost-benefit standard set forth in its appellate Benzene decision.
In a similar vein and reaching an unsurprising conclusion,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the same
court which rejected cost-benefit analysis in the Cotton Dust
case, determined in the Lead Case on an industry by industry
basis whether or not OSHA met the threshold requirement of
showing significant harm as set out in the Supreme Court Benzene decision. The court continued in its conclusion that economic feasibility is present if a standard does not threaten
massive dislocation.
Neither of the recent appellate decisions is out of character
or shows any change in position on the economic analysis question. Therefore, how will the Supreme Court resolve and reconcile the divergent appellate decisions?
In essence the question to be decided is to what extent
should/must the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
weigh economic factors when promulgating standards. This decision will affect how federal health and safety standards are applied, the amount of scientific data needed for enforcement and
the role of the regulators.
The question is immediately before the Supreme Court in
the Cotton Dust case where certiorariwas granted on questions
which squarely face the issue of cost-benefit analysis.'

8 OSHC 2205 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980).
8 OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
100 S. Ct. 68 (1980).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 83

In oral argument on the issue, held on January 21, 1981,
former Solicitor General Robert Bork, representing the nation's
textile industry made the argument that in setting "feasible
standards" as required by section 6(b)(5), OSHA must make a
responsible estimate, supported by substantial evidence of what
its proposed standard will cost and what impact it will have on
industry with respect to such factors as production, employment, competition, and prices. He strongly disagreed with the
District of Columbia's Circuit Court conclusion that an OSHA
standard is economically feasible unless the cost of compliance is
so prohibitive that it would put an entire industry out of
business. The Justice Department and AFL-CIO representatives
took the position that the statute did not impose a "magical"
cost-benefit analysis. They further stated that the requirements
set forth by OSHA in this standard would, at worst, destroy
marginal employers. As such, they concluded that the standard
is economically feasible within the meaning of the Act.
In deciding the economic analysis issue, the Supreme Court,
in the abstract has three choices: 1) to require a strict cost-benefit analysis wherein regulation not justified in terms of economic
savings are not enacted, 2) not to require agencies to consider
the costs of their regulations at all; or 3) to require an approximate balancing or weighing of costs and benefits, i.e., some type
of "economic impact" analysis.
While there is no absolute consensus as to what constitutes
cost-benefit analysis, it is generally recognized that cost-benefit
analysis is an "economic tool with which decision makers can estimate whether a governmental intervention will increase or
decrease welfare,"89 measured as "the sum of the value of goods,
services, jobs, and profits, minus the value of health and environmental damage."9 Requiring agencies to conduct an extensive
cost-benefit analysis has a number of drawbacks. The biggest
problem is the difficulty in assessing exact benefits and costs.
Most people recoil at attempts to set a value on or a maximum
amount on spending to save a life.91 "We cannot put a price on
Berger and Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibilityin Regulating
Toxic Substances Under the OccupationalSafety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.

341 (1979).
9°Id.
1

The court in Cotton Dust pertinently quoted the following comment from

P. Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, 11 NAT'L J. 711 (1979):
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the child who can be saved from disfigurement from flammable
sleepwear, or a price on the workers who can be saved from
asbestos-induced cancer." 9 Many OSHA regulations concern toxic substances which, by their very nature, present persistent
and severe regulatory problems which defy the use of traditional cost-benefit analysis. 3 For some substances, such as those
which are carcinogenic, it is extremely difficult, based upon current knowledge, to establish safe levels of exposure. Furthermore, there has been disagreement about what methods should
be used when trying to establish "safe" levels. Industry spokesmen advocate standards which, according to OSHA, would not
allow them to sufficiently protect workers from such dangers in
the workplace. While these are valid points about the great inadequacy of cost-benefit analysis,94 some type of cost consideration must be required to prevent OSHA from becoming an unnecessary burden upon American industry.
Another drawback to strict cost-benefit analysis is that it
works against the Act's stated primacy of instituting engineering and administrative controls95 over the use of personal protective equipment and it blunts the technology forcing thrust of the
Act, which was positively mentioned in the original legislation
establishing OSHA." A technology forcing statute such as the
OSH Act directs the agency to resolve doubts in favor of feasibility. The industries, then, bear the burden of showing clearly
that the task is not possible or that the cost is not justified by
the benefits. 7 A cost-benefit analysis would favor the use of personal protective equipment over the development of engineering
and administrative controls to solve a particular problem because personal protective equipment is normally less expensive
Cost-benefit analyses are also invariably flawed. The reasons for this
are well-known: the difficulty of identifying and quantifying many costs
and benefits; the inevitably arbitrary nature of valuations of human life
or health; ...

the problem of interpersonal and intergenerational com-

parisons of utility; and many others.
617 F.2d at 665 n.170.
Berger and Riskin, supra note 89, at 287.
0' Berger and Riskin, supra note 89, at 286.
For an attempt, although unsuccessful, to support cost-benefit analysis see
M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE, supra note 4.
"5 Berger

and Riskin, supra note 89, at 343.

" Id. at 323, 343.
9Doniger, FederalRegulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the
Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 561 (1979).
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than new capital expenditures. Thus, industries are not encouraged to research and develop new ways to improve safety and
health in the workplace.
On the other hand, if society is being forced to bear the
burden of regulatory costs, it must be shown that these costs
provide some reasonable benefit. Otherwise, there would be a
serious misallocation of resources: businesses would be forced to
pass up new products and innovative technological advances because of regulations forcing them to utilize their resources in
other areas. In our economy, this policy would lead to enormous
inefficiency due to the indirect costs of compliance with regulations, such as lost productivity, delays in construction of new
plants and equipment, and lost opportunities." Not examining the
costs and benefits is as extreme as requiring a formal costbenefit analysis.
Moreover, such a policy will impose undue hardships upon
small business-which cannot afford the additional costs of compliance and paperwork. Government regulation typically mandates significant front-end capital expenses upon industry. Companies with limited output are placed at a great competitive disadvantage by having to allocate a greater additional cost to each
unit. Presidents Ford and Carter were correct in attempting to
avoid these problems by requiring the executive agencies to carry out informal economic impact analyses."
Since the extremes of a formal cost-benefit analysis and no
consideration of costs both inadequately deal with the problem,
the third alternative of an approximate balancing of costs and
benefits must be carefully scrutinized. Such an "economic impact" analysis would involve observing the effect of proposed
standards on output, cost, inflation, small business and the
general state of the economy. This would be compared to the
benefits from the standard. This would mean, at the very least,
that the agencies must evaluate alternatives to the proposed
• " COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION STUDY, supra note 1; Simon, What We
Did, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1979, at 20.
" See, e.g., Executive Order 12044 (Improving Government Regulations);
during this period, the President also established the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group to implement his economic impact policy and to ensure consistency
and lack of repetition within the executive branch.
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standard: "an agency, if its rulemaking is to be sustained, must
demonstrate that it has considered relevant factors brought to
its attention by interested parties during the course of rulemaking, and that it makes a reasoned choice among the alternatives
presented.""'
The authors submit that this intermediate position requiring an economic impact analysis is the most justifiable from both
a philosophical and legal standpoint. Philosophically, strict costbenefit analysis is inappropriate because of the subjectiveness
of assigning values to social benefits such as health. This requires tremendous subjective judgments which, can be argued,
are beyond the expertise of the agency.' Application of strict
cost-benefit analysis would be forced and arbitrary. However,
the alternative of leaving OSHA unbridled discretion to regulate is beyond the intent of Congress. OSHA must be cognizant
that the economy has only so much that can be spent on safety
and health and OSHA should allocate these resources to maximize the benefits.
Legally, it can be argued that the Act does not require strict
cost-benefit analysis. When Congress wanted strict cost-benefit
analysis, it knew how to clearly put the requirement into its enactments. Yet the legislative history is replete with concern
about costs and the Act requires certain economic calculations.' 2
Finally, it is noted that the Supreme Court, in the Benzene decision has already taken the first step in requiring an informal
economic impact analysis. By requiring hazards to be "significant" and giving the example of the possible acceptability of the
one-in-one billion risk as opposed to the one-in-one thousand risk,
the Court is saying that regulation must make some economic
sense. Even though the victim of the one-in-one billion risk is
individually harmed, that is an injury which we as a society are
willing to accept. We accept it not because we are content with
the danger, but because economically it makes no sense to ex" National Industrial Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 699-700 (3d Cir.

1979).
10 See MeGarrity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretionin Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
"' See discussion of Supreme Court Benzene decision supra at notes 66-88
and accompanying text.
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pend huge sums of money to prevent the one-in-one billion injury.
As a major impediment to cost-benefit analysis is the subjectivity of assigning values to certain benefits, such as health, the
authors believe that the economic impact analysis required
under OSH Act mandates that OSHA set forth economic justification for its regulations. This can be done by setting forth the
various proposals and explaining why the selected alternative is
economically reasonable. As in all policy matters left to agency
discretion, absolute correctness is not required"°3 and, in fact
would be impossible to prove. A court of review would consider
the agency basis for decision and sustain the regulation if supported by the record. If the regulation is reasonable it would be
upheld.
IV.

CONCLUSION

OSH Act regulation is costly and the controversy over the
need for economic justification must be resolved. In resolving
the problem, Congress and the Courts must grant agencies such
as OSHA a "reasonable margin of safety" in which to protect
human life and health. The Supreme Court must balance the
need to provide OSHA with flexibility in carrying out its task
and the need to not unduly interfere with the economy. Requiring cost-benefit analysis would provide the balance.

03 Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1976); see K. DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 6.6 (1978).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/4

22

